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Economic theory provides two main explanations why changes in exchange rates 
can affect foreign direct investment (FDI). According to a first explanation, FDI 
reacts to exchange rate changes if there are information frictions on capital 
markets and if the investment by firms depends on their net worth (capital market 
friction hypothesis). According to a second explanation, FDI reacts to exchange 
rate changes if output and factor markets are segmented, and if firm-specific 
assets are important (goods market friction hypothesis). We provide a unified 
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1 Motivation 
Economic theory provides two main explanations why exchange rates matter for FDI flows. A 
first explanation rests on capital market frictions (Froot and Stein 1991). Changes in real 
exchange rates affect the probability that domestic firms win bids over foreign firms if the 
acquisition of a (foreign) firm depends on the net worth of the investor. Net worth in foreign 
currency terms, in turn, depends on the exchange rate. Capital market frictions, which differ 
across sectors and firms, should thus affect the sensitivity of FDI to exchange rate changes. 
We label this the ‘capital market friction hypothesis’. 
A second explanation stresses the interaction between goods and factor market 
segmentation and the importance of firm-specific assets. In Blonigen (1997), domestic and 
foreign firms’ reservation prices for foreign investment projects differ if firms produce in 
different countries and sell their products on different markets. Blonigen assumes that firms 
produce and sell on their home market and that FDI is used only to purchase firm-specific 
assets, i.e. the underlying technology, in a foreign country. Since firms’ revenues depend on 
exchange rate changes, their ability to bid for firm-specific assets depends on the exchange 
rate as well. We label this the ‘goods market friction hypothesis’. 
In this paper, we integrate the two explanations of exchange rate effects on FDI decisions 
into a unified framework. This allows testing these explanations in a single-equation 
econometric model. While we stay fairly close to the Froot and Stein model in terms of 
modeling the capital market friction, we relax Blonigen’s assumption that firms produce and 
sell only on the home market. Instead, we allow for production and sales on the foreign 
market while assuming a certain ‘home bias’ in firms’ activities. 
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Our paper is related to three strands of the literature. 
A first strand of the literature looks at the link between exchange rates and FDI from a 
theoretical point of view. Cushman (1985) studies the decision of firms where to buy inputs, 
where to produce, and where to finance investment. His model allows studying the integration 
of goods and factor markets simultaneously. In contrast to our model, Cushman (1985) does 
not look at the impact of capital market frictions on FDI. Moreover, his focus is on the impact 
of uncertainty over future exchange rate changes on internationalization decisions while we 
work with a framework of perfect foresight of exchange rate changes. Egger, Egger, and Ryan 
(2005) also disregard uncertainty over future exchange rate changes and analyze real effects 
of exchange rate changes in an oligopolistic model with an endogenous elasticity of demand. 
They test their model using data from the United States and Japan and find empirical evidence 
for real exchange rate effects – including third country effects – on FDI.  
A second strand of the literature tests the presence of a wealth effect stressed by Froot and 
Stein (1991) and the Blonigen-model using aggregated data (see Blonigen (2005) for a recent 
survey of the literature). Froot and Stein (1991) argue that the response of FDI to exchange 
rate changes differs from the response of other capital flows. They take this as evidence for 
the wealth effect. Klein and Rosengren (1994) use aggregated bilateral FDI data for the U.S. 
to study whether wealth effects have an impact on FDI decisions.  They test how movements 
of stock prices affect foreign direct investment decisions. Their results show that stock price 
movements affect FDI. A related strand of the literature finds that real exchange rate changes 
affect FDI (Goldberg and Klein 1998). This could be the result of changes in relative labor 
costs and/or changes in relative wealth (Klein and Rosengren 1994). Tests of the Bloningen 
(1997) model are more rare. Blonigen tests his model using count data on Japanese 
acquisitions of US firms in the 1990s. His results provide support for the hypotheses that real 
exchange rates have a significant impact on the number of acquisitions. This effect is 
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confined to firms from the manufacturing sector. Within the manufacturing sector, the 
exchange rate effect is driven by sectors and firms with high expenditures on research and 
development (R&D). If R&D intensity serves as a proxy for the importance of firm-specific 
assets, this would support the goods market friction hypothesis.  
Finally, our analysis is related to a recent strand of the literature which stresses valuation 
effects as an international adjustment channel. Gourinchas and Rey (2005) argue that capital 
gains and losses have an important impact on the net foreign asset positions of countries. Tille 
(2004) incorporates valuation effects in a new open economy macro model. The main 
assumption driving these results is that the currency structure of countries’ foreign assets and 
liabilities differs. Our paper differs because our analysis is a partial equilibrium analysis that 
takes exchange rate changes as given. Yet, valuation effects matter because they affect the 
relative wealth positions of domestic and foreign firms. 
Our paper has five parts. In the following second part, we present a stylized two-country 
model with firms relying on imported inputs and selling a fraction of their output abroad. We 
analyze how the shares of imported inputs and of exported outputs affect the impact of 
exchange rate changes on foreign acquisitions. In the third part, we incorporate frictions on 
capital markets into the model, building on Froot and Stein (1991). We find that an 
appreciation of the domestic currency increases profits in foreign currency. This effect is 
smaller for more export oriented firms than for more imported input dependent firms. For 
both types of firms, financial constraints are eased if the home currency appreciates, which 
increases the probability to win a bid for a foreign asset. In the fourth part, we test the model 
based on a sector level data set which we obtain from a detailed firm-level dataset on German 
multinational firms. We find support for the goods market friction hypothesis. An 
appreciation increases profits through cheaper imported inputs and reduces profits through 
lower export receipts. The net effect is positive, hence an appreciation promotes the 
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acquisition of new firm-specific assets abroad. We do not find support for the capital market 
friction hypothesis. Part five concludes. 
2 Firm-Specific Assets and Goods Market Frictions 
Even in today’s global markets, firms have to overcome real rigidities in the form of market 
segmentations. These real rigidities are caused by geography, differences in regulations, and 
differences in cultures. Firms that operate in different countries which have different 
monetary regimes are thus exposed to exchange rate changes. In this section, we develop a 
stylized model, which shows how exchange rates affect firms’ foreign direct investment 
decision. The acquisition of foreign firms provides access to new technologies (firm-specific 
assets) in a world where product and factors markets are segmented. (See also Blonigen 
(1997).) To model the link between good market frictions, firm-specific assets, and the 
exchange rate, we assume the following time structure: 
t = 0: o Firms decide on the structure of production and sales. They choose the volume of 
inputs (x) the volume of outputs (y) as well as the shares of inputs sourced on the 
domestic market (η ) and the share of output sold at home (µ). 
o Expectations on the exchange rate in t = 2 are formed ( [ ]2eE ) 
t = 1: o Firms bid for the purchase of a firm-specific assets (FDI). 
o Credit contracts are written. 
t = 2: o Loans are repaid. 
 
Our model is based on three implicit assumptions. First, we assume that firms take the 
exchange rate as exogenous. This assumption has recently been relaxed by Russ (2004) who 
studies the interaction between activities of multinational firms and the exchange rate. 
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Second, we assume that prices are taken as given by the firms and that prices are set in the 
domestic currency. There is no pricing to market. Prices adjust sluggishly. Hence there are 
real effects of anticipated changes in the nominal exchange rate because changes in the 
nominal exchange rate cause changes in the real exchange rate. Third, we assume that the 
shares of output sold and factors sourced in the home (and in the foreign) market are given at 
the time (t = 2) when a firm bids for a foreign asset. 
We assume that a representative firm from the home country H can sell output yH at home 
or abroad, i.e. in the foreign country F. The firm has the option to source its variable inputs xH 
on the domestic or on the foreign factor market. Let µ denote the share of output sold at home 
and η the share of input sourced at home. Dropping time indices, equation (1) shows the 
variable profits of representative firms from the home country H and from the foreign country 
F in foreign currency:1  
[ ] ( )[ ] [ ] ( )[ ]
( ) [ ][ ] ( ) [ ][ ]FHFFHFF
FHHFHHH
qqeExppeEy
qqeExppeEy
ηηµµπ
ηηµµπ
+−−+−=
−+−−+=
11
11
  (1)  
where ( )FH pp  = exogenous output prices in the domestic (foreign) market in local currency, 
( )FH qq  = exogenous input prices in the domestic (foreign) market in local currency, e = 
exchange rate in quantity notation (units of the foreign currency received for one unit of the 
domestic currency), and [ ]⋅E  = expectational operator. Let Home firm’s output yH be a 
function of variable inputs xH and fixed inputs Z, i.e. the firm-specific asset: 
( )ZxFy HH ,= .  
                                                
1  We do not model the response of demand to a change in the exchange rate. Our main results 
would remain unaffected if we assumed an isoelastic demand function. Dropping the assumption 
of an isoelastic demand function, Egger, Egger, and Ryan (2005) analyze third-country effects of 
exchange rate changes on FDI. 
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In Section 3 below, we model how domestic and foreign firms bid for the firm-specific 
asset Z. Note that, as in Blonigen (1997), the only reason for firms to invest abroad is to 
improve technology by getting access to new firm-specific assets Z.2 
The parameter )10( ≤≤ µµ  captures the share of output sold in the home markets of 
Home and Foreign firms. A high value of µ indicates that the firm sells most of its output in 
the home market. The reasons for a high share sold in the home market could be physical, 
regulatory, or cultural barriers to market integration. Similarly, the parameter η  
)10( ≤≤η captures the degree to which firms use domestic factor markets. If η = 1, the firms 
use only domestic factors of production. 
Assume that, initially, domestic and foreign firms are symmetric and have identical 
technologies 000 ZZZ
HF == . After an acquisition, the acquiring firm A posses a technology 
which is superior to the initial technology: AiAiAiAi yyZZ ,0
,
1
,
0
,
1 >→>  (i = H, F). The firms thus 
compete for purchasing the asset Z to improve technology ( )10 ZZ →  and to increase profits 
( ) ( ) 000111 ,,,,,,,, ππππ =>= ZqqppZqqpp FHFHFHFH . Let π∆  give the increase in profits 
that can be achieved by improving technology: 001 >−=∆ πππ . Firms compete for asset Z 
through the maximum price 0>∆= πZp  they are willing to pay for the asset. Since firms’ 
profits are assumed to be identical initially, the difference in the maximum price a Home and 
a Foreign firm are willing to pay for asset Z depends only on the realized profits after the 
acquisition FH 11 ,ππ . Although Home and Foreign firms are symmetric, they are likely to 
generate different shares of their profits in different currency areas. Thus, exchange rate 
changes affect the willingness to pay for the improved technology. 
                                                
2  In a slightly different context, Fosfuri and Motta (1999) analyze such foreign investment 
motivated by the search for specific knowledge. 
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To show this, we look at the effects of an exchange rate appreciation of the home currency 
on the profits given in (1): 
[ ]
( ) ( )[ ]FHFHF
HHHH
H
xqyp
e
xqyp
e
ηµπ
ηµπ
−−−=∂
∂
−=∂
∂
11
. (2) 
Exchange rate changes have different effects on Home and Foreign firms. The sign and the 
magnitude of a change in the exchange rate on profits depend on the relative importance of 
the home and the foreign market as locations for sales and sourcing. To see this, consider two 
special cases. First, for a firm that sources as much abroad as it sells abroad, we have ηµ = , 
and (2) simplifies to [ ]HHHHH xqype −=∂∂ µπ  for a Home firm. In this special case, a firm 
that generates positive operating profits has higher profits in foreign currency terms when the 
home currency appreciates ( 0>∆e ). The increase in profits of a Home firm is larger than for 
a Foreign firm if a home bias exists, i.e. µ > (1 – µ). This result does not carry over 
monotonically to the more general case of export-oriented firms ( ηµ < ). If µ is very small 
relative to η,  the effect of an home country’s currency appreciation might be a decrease in 
profits. 
Second, for an imported inputs dependent Home firm which sells its products only in the 
home market ( ηµ >=1 ), (2) reduces to FHHHH xqype ηπ −=∂∂ . Hence an appreciation of 
the home currency increases profits in foreign currency terms. The high share of imported 
inputs strengthens this effect because only the fraction η of inputs sourced at home are 
affected by the appreciation. In this case, firms sell their output at home (hence the exchange 
rate has a full effect on revenues in foreign currency terms) but their imported intermediate 
inputs become cheaper. For imported input dependent firms in general ( ηµ > ), an 
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appreciation of the home country’s currency increases profits in foreign currency terms more 
strongly than for an export oriented firm (µ < η). 
In sum, results of this section show that profits of relatively more export oriented and of 
relatively more imported input dependent firms might be affected in different intensities by 
changes in exchange rates. Both types of firms are more likely to buy the firm-specific asset Z 
if an appreciation of the domestic currency is expected. For imported inputs dependent firms, 
the effect of an appreciation of the home currency on the probability to buy a firm in the 
foreign market is even stronger than for an export oriented firm. Hence, FDI of firms which 
source a relatively high share of their inputs at home should fall ceteris paribus if the domestic 
exchange rate appreciates. FDI of firms which sell a relatively high share of their output at 
home should increase as the domestic exchange rate appreciates. 
3  Capital Market Frictions 
Different forms of international organization of production and sales – and thus the ‘real’ side 
of the investment decision – are only one reason why firms’ international investment depends 
on exchange rates. A second channel through which exchange rate changes affect FDI is a 
wealth effect which stems from capital market frictions. To show this, we need to be more 
explicit on the structure of capital markets. 
Assume, as in Froot and Stein (1991), that capital markets are characterized by 
asymmetries in information. These information asymmetries imply that the investment by a 
firm is a function of its initial wealth w, which we can think of as accumulated profits from 
previous periods. The initial wealth w of investors may not be sufficient to finance the 
acquisition of foreign investment projects, and investors need external finance. We assume 
that debt finance is the only form of external finance that is available. Capital markets are 
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characterized by a costly state verification problem. External lenders cannot observe the 
actual project outcome but must pay a monitoring cost if the firm declares to be insolvent. 
We assume perfectly mobile capital and risk-neutral agents. Hence the uncovered interest 
rate parity (UIP) holds [ ]( ) 1121 eeeErr FH −=− , where rH (rF) = home (foreign) interest rate. 
The interest rates are assumed to be exogenous. We normalize the foreign interest rate to zero. 
Under perfect foresight, the (exogenous) exchange rate (in period 2) [ ]21 eE  can be set at one, 
and the UIP condition simplifies to eer 111 1 ==+  where rrr FH =− . 
The foreign economy offers a large number of firm-specific assets Zi which increase 
productivity, the output y, and therefore the profits π of the acquiring firm, as described 
above. These assets can be used by a Foreign or by a Home firm. Let ∆π denote changes in 
profits which result from the acquisition of asset Zi. Thus, changes in profits before servicing 
external debt are given by Hiπ∆ if a Home firm manages the asset and by Fiπ∆  if a Foreign 
firm manages a particular asset Zi. 
Profits on the firm specific assets are stochastic. Ex ante, it is common knowledge, that 
H
iπ∆ and Fiπ∆  are uniformly distributed on the interval [ ]jΠ,0  where jΠ  is publicly 
observable and j = H, F. The upper limit jΠ  affects the expected value of Hπ∆  and the bid 
price and, therefore, the amount of FDI. In this model, the volume of foreign direct 
investment is equal to the value of the acquisition of foreign assets. Ex post, asset returns are 
observable at no cost to the firms, but external lenders must pay a monitoring cost c  to verify 
profits. 
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3.1 Return to Lenders 
Assume that Home and Foreign firms have access to the same loan opportunities. Hence 
capital markets are completely integrated internationally,3 but imperfect because of the 
information friction that affects domestic and foreign borrowers alike. A loan L commits the 
firm to a payment Ω  to the lender. The lender receives this repayment only if the (risky) 
return on asset Zi yields more than Ω, otherwise the firm cannot repay, and the lender 
liquidates the project. The liquidation value equals the value of the project minus the 
monitoring cost c. Hence the lender’s revenue is state-dependent: 
⎩⎨
⎧
Ω<∆−∆
Ω≥∆Ω=
ii
iL
ifc
if
R ππ
π
 
The expected return of the lender for a given contract that guaranties Ω  is given by:  
jj
L cR Π
Ω−Π
Ω−Ω=
2
2
1  (3) 
Perfect competition among lenders implies that the expected return equals the return of 
investing L into the risk-free asset. This return is given by ( )LrRL += 1 . This sets a ceiling to 
the loan given to a borrowing firm. The maximum loan maxL  is given by 
( ) ( )( )rcL jj +Π−Π= 12/2max . 
                                                
3  The location of the lender does not matter if (i) the firm-specific assets must be paid in the 
currency of the country where the firms bid on the asset and if (ii) monitoring costs are the same 
for home and foreign lenders. 
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3.2 Return to Firms 
The (foreign) asset Zi will be managed by the firm which can pay the highest price P for this 
asset. The price P that a Home firm with ability HΠ  can offer depends on its wealth Hw  in 
foreign currency *Hw . While the wealth of a Foreign firm in foreign currency Fw  is 
unaffected by exchange rate changes, the wealth of a Home firm in foreign currency *Hw  
changes: eww HH =*  with 0* >∂∂ ewH . Hence an appreciation of the home currency raises 
the foreign currency wealth of home-country firms. Higher wealth lowers the cost of external 
finance. This reduces the costs of acquiring asset Z and increases the maximum price of a 
Home firm and therefore the probability to win the bid on the asset. This is an additional 
channel through which exchange rates affect FDI. Wealth expressed in foreign currency – and 
therefore the ability to borrow – increases for Home firms when the home country’s exchange 
rate appreciates.  
3.3 Comparative Statics 
Appendix A shows that the bid price of a firm that is not credit-constrained is given by  
( ) ( )
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
Π
+−−Π+= − 2
1
*
1 121
2
1 j
j rwcrP . (4) 
The bid price of the firm is a function of the additional profits jΠ , of the initial wealth 
expressed in foreign currency w*, and of the monitoring costs c. In particular, the bid price is a 
non-linear function of initial wealth w* over the whole domain. Moreover, depending on w*, 
not all firm are unconstrained because lenders set a maximum amount that they are willing to 
lend. In order to derive the comparative static results of a change in the exogenous variables 
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on the bid price – and thus on the amount of foreign direct investment –, it is useful to 
distinguish three scenarios that are characterized by differences in initial wealth. 
3.3.1 Low Initial Wealth 
A Home firm i with initial wealth below the threshold: ( )r
cw H
H
+Π≤≤
∗
12
0
2
is in a credit-
rationed corner solution. It uses external borrowing up to the upper ceiling set by the lender. 
Its bid price increases one-to-one with its wealth in foreign currency w*. For a Home firm 
characterized by low initial wealth, the maximum bid price is given by 
( ) ( )( ) ∗∗ ++Π −Π=+=Π HH
H
HHlow w
r
cwLcwP
12
,,,,
2
maxmax µη . (5) 
As in Froot and Stein (1991), the reservation bid price of a Home firm lowPmax  is decreasing 
in c and increasing in *Hw  and HΠ : 
( )( )
( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( )
[ ] )6d(
)6c(0
12
2
)6b(1
)a6(0
12
14
maxmaxmax
2
2
max
*
max
max
HHHH
H
low
H
H
H
low
H
low
H
HHH
j
low
H
low
H
HHlow
xqypPw
e
Pw
e
P
r
ccP
w
P
r
cr
c
P
ηµ −Π∂
∂+=∂
Π∂
Π∂
∂+=∂
∂
>+Π
−Π−Π−Π=Π∂
∂
=∂
∂
<+Π
−Π+Π−=∂
∂
 
Regarding the impact of monitoring costs c, initial wealth in foreign currency *Hw , and 
project returns HΠ , these results are qualitatively identical to those obtained in Froot and 
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Stein (1991). Recall that HΠ  is the highest value the increase in profits from the acquisition 
Hπ∆  can reach because Hπ∆  is uniformly distributed on [0, HΠ ]. The upper limit HΠ  
affects the expected value of Hπ∆  and, as seen in (6c), the bid price and the amount of FDI.  
Turning to the impact of changes in exchange rates, (6d) shows that an appreciation of the 
home currency increases the wealth of a Home firm (in terms of the foreign currency) and 
raises its ability to bid successfully for foreign investment projects. This result is qualitatively 
the same as in Froot and Stein (1991).  
In addition to the wealth effect, there is a second effect which works through the increase 
in profits created by the goods market frictions. Note, that the degree to which firms use the 
home country’s output and input markets has an impact on the effect of exchange rates 
changes Home firms’ bid prices and therefore on FDI. An appreciation of the home currency 
reduces input prices in the foreign country. This effect increases profits and works in the same 
direction as a decline in monitoring costs. Moreover, an appreciation of the home currency 
increases profits in foreign currency terms. For imported input dependent firms with a 
relatively large share of imported inputs ( ηµ > ), the effect of an appreciation of the home 
country’s currency on the bid price for a foreign asset is even stronger. The bid price increases 
more than proportionally. Thus, the wealth effect and the impact of goods market frictions 
work into the same direction: an appreciation of home countries currency increases the 
probability to engage in FDI. 
3.3.2 Medium Initial Wealth 
A firm with medium initial wealth is characterized by ( ) ( )rwr
c jH
j +
Π≤≤+Π 1212
*
2
. The bid 
price increases in wealth wH* but at a rate lower than one since it is optimal to reduce the 
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amount borrowed as wealth increases. A firm with medium initial wealth does not borrow the 
full amount from the lender. For such a firm, the maximum bid price is given by (7) 
( ) ( ) ( )
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
Π
+−−Π+=Π
∗−∗ 2
1
1
max
121
2
1,,,, j
Hj
Hjmed rwcrcwP µη . (7) 
The effect of exchange rate changes is not as strong as for firms with low initial wealth 
because the wealth effect is not as important. The bid price increases less than proportionally 
in wealth. The effect of an exchange rate appreciation is, therefore, dampened as seen in (8): 
( ) [ ]HHHHjmedHj
j
j
medH
H
medmed
xqypP
w
rc
e
P
e
w
w
P
e
P
ηµ −Π∂
∂+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
Π
+=
∂
Π∂
Π∂
∂+∂
∂
∂
∂=∂
∂
max2
1
max
*
*
maxmax
12
2
1
 (8) 
where the first term on the RHS is positive but smaller than one (see the definition of firms 
with medium wealth). Thus, the effects of exchange rate changes are qualitatively similar to 
those for firms with low initial wealth but are less pronounced. The reason is that capital 
market frictions matter less. The effects that result from output and input markets (µ and η) 
remain qualitatively the same. 
3.3.3 High Initial Wealth 
A firm with high initial wealth is characterized by ( ) ∗<+
Π w
r
j
12
. For such a firm, the 
maximum bid price is given by ( ) ( )rP
j
jhigh
+
Π=Π
12
,,max µη . In this scenario, the wealth effect 
does not matter because initial wealth is sufficiently high to bid for the asset up to its expected 
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value ( )rj +Π 12 . No external finance is needed, i.e. the bid price depends only on the net 
present value of the asset. Accordingly, the capital market effect of exchange rates is switched 
off, as in Froot and Stein (1991). Still, exchange rates affect FDI decisions even in this 
scenario because they affect the returns of the asset net of debt payments: 
( )[ ]HHHH
high
highhigh
xqyp
re
P
w
P
c
P
ηµ −+=∂
∂
=∂
∂=∂
∂
12
1
0
max
maxmax
  (9) 
An appreciation of the home country’s currency increases the bid price for Home firms. 
This effect is stronger for imported input dependent firms. 
In sum, our model holds the following empirically testable implications: 
First, an appreciation of the home currency should increase FDI because of goods market 
frictions. Profits generated in the home market increase in terms of the foreign currency 
terms, which enables a Home firm to bid up to a higher price. This effect is stronger for an 
imported inputs dependent firm than for an export oriented firm. 
Second, an appreciation of the home currency increases FDI through the wealth effect. 
Third, the impact of exchange rate changes should be greater for more credit-constrained 
firms, i.e. for firms facing higher monitoring costs, and for firms needing a high share of 
external finance.  
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4 Empirical Evidence 
Why does FDI react to exchange rate changes? The aim of our model has been to combine 
two explanations that have been proposed in the literature. As in Blonigen (1997), FDI can 
provide access to firm-specific assets. Whether a firm wins a bid is affected by the exchange 
rate if goods markets are not perfectly integrated (‘goods market friction hypothesis’). As in 
Froot and Stein (1991), exchange rate changes affect FDI through a wealth effect (‘capital 
market friction hypothesis’).  
Testing our model requires sector- or even firm-level data. The reason is that most of the 
variation in goods market and capital market frictions is in the cross-section rather than in the 
time series. We use a firm-level dataset on outward FDI of German firms to test our model. 
Since the data are used for a study of exchange rate effects on German FDI for the first time,4 
we describe the construction of the data set before turning to the empirical evidence. 
4.1 Data 
We test our model using a firm-level data set on the foreign affiliates of German firms 
provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. The data base goes back to 1989, and it includes 
information on practically all foreign affiliates of German firms abroad (and of affiliates of 
foreign firms in Germany). (For details see Lipponer (2002).) We restrict the cross-section 
and the time series dimension of the data for two reasons.  
First, time series for individual enterprises are available for the years 1996 through 2003 
only. For the years 1989–1995, affiliate-level data are available but individual affiliates 
cannot be traced over time. Hence, before 1996, we do not know whether a foreign affiliate of 
                                                
4  Buch et al. (2005) provide a general description of the data and of the patterns of German FDI. 
Buch and Lipponer (2005) look at the impact of business cycles on FDI and also find a 
significant impact of real exchange rates on changes in German FDI abroad. 
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a given German firms appears in the database for the first time because it has been newly 
acquired or because the code of the affiliate has changed. Our model is about newly acquired 
affiliates. Changes in FDI adding to existing foreign affiliates are not captured since there is 
no competition between Home and Foreign firms bidding for these investments. Hence, the 
model focuses on the acquisition of new foreign affiliates, we thus use data starting in 1996. 
Second, although our data contain firm-level information, we use the data at a sector level 
of aggregation. The model holds predictions on the impact of capital market frictions and the 
importance of the home market as source of inputs and market for outputs. We do not have 
information on the input and output patterns of individual reporting firms, and we have to use 
sector proxies instead. Testing our theoretical model requires sector level data for Germany 
and for the foreign country. This essentially restricts our choice of host countries to OECD 
countries. We create a panel data set which aggregates all firms from a specific sector on a 
country-by-country basis. The cross-section dimension of our data is thus defined through a 
combination of the sector of the foreign affiliate (15 sectors) and the foreign countries. 
Observations with missing entries for some of the explanatory variables are dropped. The 
time series dimension comprises a maximum of 6 years (1997-2002). We loose one year of 
observations at the beginning as we focus on new acquisitions of the same parent, and one 
year at the end because of missing observations for some of the explanatory variables. 
Another reason for using the data at a sector level is that our theoretical model holds 
predictions for the probability of a given firm to invest abroad. Testing the model on the basis 
of firm-level data would require information on all German firms. The database that we use, 
however, has information only on firms that have affiliates in foreign countries. Yet, 
aggregating over the investment probability of all German firms results in the number of 
German affiliates in a particular sector of a foreign country. This is the dependent variable we 
use. 
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We generate our dependent variable by counting the number of new foreign affiliates that 
each reporting firm establishes in a given foreign country. We then aggregate this count 
variable over all reporting firms in a particular home sector for each foreign country. In a 
similar way, we calculate the volume of FDI in these newly established foreign affiliates. 
Investments adding to existing investment objects of investors are thus excluded. The reason 
is that other external investors cannot bid for these additions to existing affiliates. 
The data base contains mainly information from the foreign affiliates’ balance sheets that 
are needed to calculate the direct investment stocks. We have little information about the 
reporting firm, i.e. about the German parent firm. With regard to the parent, information is 
restricted to the economic sector in which the firm is active.5 A sector break down is also 
available for the foreign affiliate. Since 1995, allocation to economic sectors has been based 
on the classification in NACE Revision 1. The data base contains entries for about 65 
different sectors at the two-digit and three-digit level. We aggregate the data to 24 sectors, 15 
of these being manufacturing sectors and mining. Only these 15 sectors compose our initial 
sample, because some of the explanatory data are available only for manufacturing and 
mining. 
Over the years, several adjustments have been made to the reporting exemption limits. In 
the period October 1993 through February 2002, German enterprises had to report their 
foreign affiliates if the balance sheet total exceeded €5 million (for minority participation 
rights subject to reporting requirements). In the case of majority participation rights as well as 
branches and permanent establishments, foreign affiliates reported whether their balance sheet 
total was more than €500,000. Indirect participating interests had to be reported if a 
“dependent” foreign affiliate had a holding of 10% or more in another enterprise. Since March 
2002, a uniform reporting threshold of 3 million euro has been in place. Due to these changes 
                                                
5  Information on the size of the parents has been collected only since 2002. 
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in the reporting limits, foreign affiliates have entered and left the data base. However, these 
changes in the composition of the database are unrelated to acquisitions of new foreign 
affiliates. We address this potential problem by using the higher exemption limits introduced 
in 2002 for all years. The changes to the exemption limits have affected mainly smaller units. 
Hence they are likely to affect our count variable of the number of acquisitions abroad. The 
volume of FDI should be affected to a lesser extent.  
 It could be objected that our results are affected by valuation effects that re-value existing 
foreign affiliates. These valuation effects must be distinguished from the type of valuation 
effects stressed on our model. In our model, valuation effects matter only through the impact 
of exchange rates on the initial wealth of Home country firms and through the impact on 
future generated profits. This affects the ability of Home and Foreign firms to bid for foreign 
assets. Valuation effects that work through a re-valuation of existing assets abroad are not a 
concern in our set-up for two reasons. First, in most of the regressions reported below, we use 
the number of affiliates rather than the volume of FDI as the dependent variable. This count 
variable is, by definition, not affected by valuation effects. Second, even for those regressions 
where we use the change in the volume of FDI as the dependent variable, valuation effects are 
not important as we use information on new investment objects only.  
4.2 Empirical Model 
Equation (8) gives the response one representative investor with medium initial wealth to a 
change in the exchange rate. As the home currency appreciates, each investor is more likely to 
invest abroad the higher initial wealth, the higher the share of output sold at home, the lower 
the share of inputs sourced at home, and the lower monitoring costs. We implement our 
theoretical model by aggregating firm-level data to sector aggregates. Hence, the firm-specific 
probability to invest in a particular foreign country translates into the number of firms that 
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enter a particular sector in a foreign country. We can thus derive the following equation after 
aggregation, linearization, and adding an error term: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ijtjijtijtijtjtjtjtijt distvacleveeeN εββββµβηββ ++++∆+∆+∆+=∆ lnln 6543210  (10)  
where ijtN∆  = logarithms of the number of foreign affiliates of German firms entering sector i 
in country j in period t. ijtlev  = share of debt liabilities over total assets (‘leverage’) of the 
foreign affiliates of sector i in country j, ijtva  = foreign value added, and jdist  = logarithm of 
distance. The descriptive statistics of the endogenous and exogenous variables is given in 
Table A2 in the appendix. 
In equation (10), the coefficients 1β  and 2β  allow testing the goods market friction 
hypothesis. Since the exchange rate is defined in quantity notation, we expect a negative sign 
on the interaction term between the share of home sourced inputs η  and the change in the 
exchange rate ( 01 <β ). The expected sign on the interaction term between the exchange rate 
and the share of output sold at home µ  is positive ( 02 >β ).  
The coefficients 3β , 4β , and 6β  allow testing the capital market frictions hypothesis. 
Below, we discuss the expected signs of these coefficients. 
We use ‘leverage’ as a continuous proxy for the importance of initial wealth. We do not 
split firms into those with high, medium, and low initial wealth as in the theoretical model. 
The higher the leverage ratio, the lower are the own funds that an investor has to bring into a 
project, i.e. the lower her required initial wealth. Hence we expect a negative sign on this 
variable ( 03 <β ).  
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Monitoring costs ijtc  are not directly observable. We use two proxies which are related to 
the sectoral and to the regional dimension of our data. The first proxy is based on Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) who suggest a classification of industries according to their degree of 
financial dependence. This measure relies on the share of capital expenditures financed with 
cash flows from operations. Fisman and Love (2003) update their study. We use results from 
these studies to rank industries by their degree of financial dependence. External dependence 
is calculated as a ratio of investment minus cash flow divided by investment and captures the 
percent of total investment that is financed by the external funds. Hence a high degree of 
financial dependence may be taken as an indication that monitoring costs are low, and the 
expected sign would be positive. Note, that this variable is included to capture the degree of 
financial dependence of the home sector. It differs from the degree of leverage observed at the 
level of the foreign affiliate, which we calculate directly from our database. At the country-
level, we include the geographic distance between Germany and the host countries. If 
monitoring costs increase in distance, the coefficient on this variable should be negative 
( 06 <β ).  
The change in the exchange rate between the D-mark (through 1999) and the euro (after 
1999) and the host country currency ( jte∆ ) is defined in quantity notation as in the theoretical 
model. Hence an increase in the exchange rate corresponds to an appreciation of the home 
currency. In addition to the nominal exchange rate, we specify our model also in terms of the 
real exchange rate, which is computed using sector-level price indices. The real exchange rate 
also captures changes in foreign output and input prices FF qp , relative to German output and 
input prices HH qp , . Because the information on producer prices is incomplete, our sample is 
restricted when using the real instead of the nominal exchange rate. The advantage of using 
the real exchange rate is that countries from the Euro area, while showing no variation in their 
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nominal exchange rates vis-à-vis Germany, do show quite significant variation in their 
bilateral real exchange rates. 
We proxy the importance of the home market for sourcing inputs and selling output for the 
average firms by one minus the share of imported inputs and the share of exported outputs 
from input-output tables at the sectoral level. The OECD provides these input-output tables at 
the two-digit level for 24 sectors including agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and services 
sectors. The most recent data available for Germany is for the year 1995. 
Finally, we include the log of the value added of the sector of the foreign country ( ijtva ) to 
control for the size of foreign sector. All else equal, we expected more activity in larger 
sectors and therefore a positive sign on this variable ( 05 >β ). 
4.3 Regression Results  
We estimate equation (10) using random effects panel regression models with robust standard 
errors. Observations are clustered around each group, i.e. the sector-country combination. Our 
analysis proceeds in three steps. In a first step, we analyze the effect of exchange rate changes 
on the number of new affiliates of German firms in a particular sector of a particular country 
in a particular year. In a second step, we analyze effects of exchange rate change on the 
volume of FDI in newly acquired firms. In a third step, we test whether smaller – and 
presumably more wealth-constrained – firms react more to the exchange rate than larger 
firms.  
4.3.1 Number of Acquisitions 
We analyze the effect of exchange rate changes on the number of new affiliates of German 
firms in a particular sector of a particular country in a particular year using a poisson 
regression panel model with random effects. This allows exploiting the variation over time 
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and over the cross-section units. The results are given in Table 1. We specified two versions. 
The baseline specification as specified in equation (10) is given in columns (1) and (3). 
Additionally, we include also the R&D intensity of the sector and the lagged endogenous 
variable (columns (2) and (4) of Table 1). We run the regression for changes in the nominal 
and the real exchange rate.  
The coefficients of the variables which are prominent in the goods market friction 
hypothesis, β1 and β2 have the expected sign. While β2 is always significant at least on the 
10% level, β1 is significant only in the second specification. β1 is somewhat more significant 
when using the real rather than the nominal exchange rate. That is in line with theory which 
sees sluggish price adjustment as a main reason for exchange rate effects on FDI. With 
sluggish price adjustment, profits to a Home firm increase as the home currency appreciates if 
the firm sells a higher share of its output at home. However, profits fall if the Home currency 
appreciates if the firm sources a high share of its inputs at home.  
Columns (2) and (4) additionally include a proxy for the R&D intensity of each sector. 
Since firm-specific assets are more often found in sectors with high R&D intensities, the 
positive coefficient of R&D intensity is in line with expectations.  
Finally, sector size, proxied through sector value added, is significant and has the expected 
positive sign in all specifications. 
We do not find evidence that capital market frictions cause exchange rate effects on FDI. 
Turning to the variables which are prominent in the capital markets friction hypothesis, 
neither of them is significant. The interaction term between leverage and the exchange rate 
has the expected negative, albeit insignificant, sign in three of the four regressions shown in 
Table 1. The share of external finance as a proxy for the monitoring costs is insignificant. 
Distance is significant in two specifications but distance certainly reflects more than just 
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monitoring costs. Hence, the negative coefficient cannot be taken as support for the capital 
markets friction hypothesis. 
4.3.2 Volume of New FDI 
In Table 2, we report results using the volume of FDI invested in newly acquired affiliates 
rather than the number of new acquisitions as the dependent variable. The findings are 
broadly similar to those reported in Table 1, but there are some important differences. The 
coefficient reflecting the interaction between exchange rates and the share of imported inputs 
β1 turns positive. It is, however, insignificant in all four specifications. Thus, the evidence for 
the goods’ market friction hypothesis rests solely on β2. Yet, although β2 has the expected 
sign, it is significant (at the 10% level) in only one of the four regressions. The goods market 
friction hypothesis finds less (if any) support if we are looking at the size of the new 
investment.  
The capital market hypothesis does not find more support. Leverage, which captures the 
wealth effect, has the wrong sign and is mostly insignificant, while the share of external 
finance and distance are insignificant.  
Thus, using FDI data instead of newly acquired firms at this level of aggregation clouds the 
exchange rate effect. That results probably because of the heterogeneity of the new 
investment. One larger investment outweighs more numerous smaller acquisitions which 
introduces additionally heterogeneity which can not be explained on the basis of the two 
theories outline above. 
4.3.3 Robustness Test: Small Firms Only 
Results reported so far may not given support to the capital market frictions hypothesis 
because they are pooled across large and small firms in the sample. For at least two reasons 
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though, small firms may be affected more by capital market frictions than larger firms. First, 
information asymmetries tend to we more severe for small than for large firms. This is one 
reason why, second, small firms are more dependent on bank lending. Hence, we expect the 
capital market variables to exert a stronger effect on the small firms in the sample. Table 3 
replicates the set of regressions reported in Table 1, but it restricts the sample to smaller firms. 
We exclude all firms with above average size (measured in terms of affiliate sales). These are 
far less than half of the firms in our sample.  
The results are similar to those reported in Table 1. The main difference is that there is now 
some evidence for the capital market friction hypothesis. The share of external finance is 
positive and significant in the regressions using the real exchange rate. It becomes 
insignificant though when the measure for R&D intensity is included, and we obtain a 
positive coefficient in the regression using the nominal exchange rate. Hence, while results 
reported in columns (1) and (3) of Table 3 give some support for the capital market frictions 
hypothesis, we do not want to stress this too far. 
The goods market friction hypothesis finds even stronger support than in the full sample. 
β1 is negative and significant in two of the four regressions. As expected, β2 is positive and 
significant at the one percent level. As before, the market size coefficient is positive, 
significant at the 1%, and robust against specification changes. As in Table 1 and despite of 
the possible multicolinearity with the share of external finance, the coefficient on the R&D 
variable is significantly positive.  
5 Conclusions 
Increased cross-border investments of firms and large swings of exchange rates suggest that 
exchange rate changes might trigger entry into foreign markets. Earlier literature has 
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discussed two main reasons why exchange rates affect foreign direct investment decisions. On 
the one hand, frictions on capital markets affect FDI through a wealth effect. On the other 
hand, firms differ in the degree to which they use domestic and foreign output and factor 
markets. This affects their ability and incentives to bid for firm-specific assets on international 
markets. 
In this paper, we have developed a theoretical framework that combines these two 
explanations. We have shown that both, capital and goods market frictions, can be sources of 
the effects of exchange rate changes on FDI. Regarding the capital market friction hypothesis, 
the model proposes that FDI of sectors (or of firms) that face greater credit market restrictions 
respond more to exchange rate changes. Regarding the goods market friction hypothesis, the 
model proposes that the effect of exchange rate changes on FDI depends on the degree to 
which firms use the home country as output and factor market. An appreciation of the home 
currency has a greater impact on FDI the higher the share of output sold on the home market 
and the lower the share of inputs sourced at home. 
We test these hypotheses using a dataset of German firms’ activities abroad from 1997 to 
2003 at the sector level. We find support for the goods market friction hypothesis. An 
exchange rate appreciation raises profits of a home country firm in terms of the foreign 
currency, and raises therefore the probability to bid successfully for a foreign asset. Through 
cheaper imported inputs (less dependence on the home market for input sourcing), the effect 
on profits is strengthened further. We find no support for the capital market friction 
hypothesis, in contrast. We find neither a wealth effect nor an effect of information costs on 
FDI in our sample. That might result from the dominance of large firms in the group of 
multinational firms with, presumably, high initial wealth. This group of firms might not be 
affected by a wealth effect resulting from capital market frictions. 
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7 Technical Appendix 
7.1 Expected Return of the Lender 
The expected result to the lender given in equation (3) can be derived by noting that returns 
iπ  are uniformly distributed on the interval [ ]jΠ,0 , implying that 
jji dprob Π
Ω=Π=Ω≤ ∫
Ω
0
1)( ππ  and jiprob Π
Ω−=Ω> 1)(π . For Ω≤iπ (insolvency), the 
lender receives iπ . The expectation value of iπ  conditional on insolvency is thus given by 
2
1
2
111 2
0
2
0 0
Ω
Π=Π=Π=Π
ΩΩ Ω∫ ∫ jjjj dd πππππ . Moreover, in the case of insolvency, i.e. with 
probability jΠΩ , the lender monitors and incurs the monitoring cost c. For Ω>iπ  
(solvency), i.e. with probability jΠΩ− /1 , the lender gets Ω.  
7.2 Bid Price of an Unconstrained Entrepreneur 
The maximum price P that firms can pay for an asset Z has to meet two conditions. First, it 
cannot exceed the expected value of the firm-specific asset Z. Second, the maximum price 
equals the maximum loan plus firms’ initial wealth wL +max . As an alternative to buying the 
asset Z, firms can invest into a risk-free asset. Therefore, the maximum price that a not credit-
constrained firm is willing to pay for the firm-specific asset Z cannot exceed ( )rwP += 1max . 
The expected return for a firm which agrees to a repayment Ω  is denoted by R : 
22
2 j
jR
Π+Ω−Π
Ω=  (4) 
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If the firm is not credit constrained, it is willing to bid up to ( )wrR += 1 . In equilibrium, the 
sum of the returns of lenders LR  and borrowers R  cannot exceed returns of a non-credit 
constrained firm when investing in the risk-free asset ( )( )wLr ++1 . Thus, adding (3) and (4) 
and assuming that the firm is not credit-constrained yields 
( )( )wLrc j
j
++=Π
Ω−Π 1
2
 (5)  
Substituting the price P ( wL += ) into (5) and solving for P yields 
( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
Π
Ω−Π+= − j
j crP
2
1 1  (6) 
Using (4) to eliminate Ω  and noting that the return of the entrepreneur in equilibrium is given 
by ( )wrR FD += 1 , we obtain the bid prices of an unconstrained entrepreneur as 
( ) ( ) ⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
Π
+−−Π+= − 2
1
1 121
2
1 j
j rwcrP  (7) 
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Table A1: Data Definitions and Sources 
Acquisitions: Information on the number of new foreign affiliates of a German sector in a 
foreign country has been taken from the firm-level database International Capital Links 
provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Debt liabilities over assets: This variable has been computed using the database International 
Capital Links of the Deutsche Bundesbank. It gives the ratio of affiliate’s liabilities 
(Verbindlichkeiten) over total assets of the affiliate (Bilanzsumme) in percent. 
Distance: Distance is taken from CEPII (2004). The geodesic distances are calculated 
applying the great circle formula, which uses longitude and latitude of countries’ capital 
cities. 
Exported outputs: OECD Input-Output Tables include exported goods for 24 sectors. We used 
the German data for 1995. Exported output is used as share over total output which is also 
taken from the OECD Input-Output Tables. 
External finance: Information on the share of external finance has been taken from Fisman 
and Love (2003). It is calculated as a ratio of investment minus cash flow divided by 
investment and captures the percent of total investment that is financed by the external funds. 
FDI: Information on the foreign direct investment by a German sector in a foreign country has 
been taken from the firm-level database International Capital Links provided by the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. 
Imported inputs: OECD Input-Output Tables include imported intermediate goods for 24 
sectors. We used the German data for 1995. Imported input is used as share over total input 
which is also taken from the OECD Input-Output Tables. 
Nominal exchange rate: The nominal exchange rate is defined in quantity notation, i.e. an 
increase in the exchange rate corresponds to an appreciation of the exchange rate. 
Real exchange rate: The real exchange rate is defined in quantity notation, using the nominal 
exchange rate and sectoral price indices. 
Sectoral value added: CEPII Database on Trade & Production provided us with sectoral value 
added for our 15 sectors and 86 countries. 
(http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/TradeProd.htm). 
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics 
These Tables gives descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis. sd = standard deviation. 
(a) Time varying variables 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Endogenous variables       
Log number of acquisitions mean sd 
1.66 
3.14 
1.78 
3.12 
1.65 
3.23 
1.64 
3.32 
1.44 
2.85 
1.29 
2.58 
Log volume of FDI mean sd 
8.55 
1.79 
8.93 
1.80 
8.97 
1.78 
9.09 
1.84 
8.88 
1.89 
9.00 
1.89 
Exogenous variables       
Real exchange rate mean sd 
1.92 
21.89 
2.76 
14.64 
5.90 
15.05 
– 2.54 
11.39 
– 0.77 
4.36 
 
Nominal exchange rate mean sd 
4.401 
32.87 
9.44 
25.46 
– 3.59 
24.86 
0.77 
46.64 
– 3.33 
23.58 
24.54 
241.69 
Leverage of newly acquired 
firms ⋅ nominal exchang 
rate 
mean 
sd 
2.15 
21.83 
5.14 
16.58 
– 2.40 
14.95 
– 1.73 
10.49 
– 1.56 
8.37 
16.13 
223.51 
Leverage of newly acquired 
firms ⋅ real exchange rate 
mean 
sd 
1.22 
8.74 
3.83 
13.47 
– 2.23 
6.03 
– 0.79 
3.42 
  
Log sector value added mean sd 
14.59 
1.92 
14.53 
1.92 
14.61 
2.06 
15.25 
1.62 
15.17 
1.68 
14.91 
1.56 
 
(2) Time invariant variables 
 Share of external finance 
Log 
distance 
R&D expenditure over 
sector output (%) 
Share of final 
goods sold at home 
(%) 
Share of intermediate 
goods imported (%) 
mean 0.44 7.85 2.19 69.04 77.72 
sd 0.34 1.23 1.86 20.62 11.35 
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Table 1: Regressions Results for Number of Acquisitions, 1997–2002 
This Table gives results of poisson regressions with random effects. Observations are clustered around each 
group. For a description of the variables see Section 4.2. t-values are based on White heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
 Nominal exchange rate changes Real exchange rate changes 
Home sourced inputs ⋅ 
appreciation 
– 0.0003 
(0.52) 
– 0.0013* 
(1.89) 
– 0.0008 
(1.41) 
– 0.0016** 
(2.08) 
Output sold at Home ⋅ 
appreciation 
0.0005** 
(2.05) 
0.0006*** 
(2.76) 
0.0005* 
(1.96) 
0.0010*** 
(2.62) 
Leverage of newly 
acquired firms ⋅ 
appreciation 
0.0078 
(0.68) 
– 0.0144 
(0.93) 
– 0.0087 
(0.69) 
– 0.0220 
(1.30) 
Share of external finance – 0.1051 (0.58) 
– 0.3231 
(1.10) 
– 0.1227 
(0.67) 
0.2582 
(0.83) 
Log sector size 0.1929*** (7.70) 
0.1920*** 
(6.00) 
0.1885*** 
(7.22) 
0.1800*** 
(5.33) 
Log distance – 0.0749 (1.63) 
– 0.1020* 
(1.95) 
– 0.0692 
(1.44) 
– 0.1053* 
(1.92) 
R&D intensity  0.0492* (1.70)  
0.0491 
(1.61) 
Lag number of 
acquisitions  
0.0173*** 
(2.65)  
0.0205*** 
(2.84) 
Constant – 1.1560*** (2.60) 
– 1.2264** 
(2.25) 
– 1.0789** 
(2.25) 
– 0.9477 
(1.62) 
Observations 742 444 552 317 
Number of groups 215 144 210 140 
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Table 2: Regressions Results for the Volume of New FDI, 1997–2002 
This Table gives results of poisson regressions with random effects. Observations are clustered around each 
group. For a description of the variables see Section 4.2. t-values are based on White heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
 Nominal exchange rate changes Real exchange rate changes 
Home sourced inputs ⋅ 
appreciation 
0.0002 
(0.28) 
0.0019 
(0.76) 
0.0003 
(0.23) 
0.0038 
(1.38) 
Output sold at Home ⋅ 
appreciation 
0.0007* 
(1.65) 
0.0005 
(0.45) 
0.0004 
(0.74) 
0.0008 
(0.65) 
Leverage of newly 
acquired firms ⋅ 
appreciation 
0.0367 
(1.52) 
0.0868* 
(1.91) 
0.0075 
(0.34) 
0.0559 
(1.14) 
Share of external finance – 0.1944 (0.66) 
0.4805 
(1.08) 
– 0.3443 
(0.97) 
0.4108 
(0.87) 
Log sector size 0.2867*** (4.24) 
0.2806*** 
(3.09) 
0.2573*** 
(3.59) 
0.2230** 
(2.28) 
Log distance – 0.1026 (1.21) 
– 0.0075 
(0.07) 
– 0.1324 
(1.43) 
– 0.0377 
(0.30) 
R&D intensity  – 0.0046 (0.10)  
– 0.0111** 
(0.22) 
Lag number of 
acquisitions  
0.2034** 
(2.55)  
0.2048** 
(2.44) 
Constant 5.5280*** (4.89) 
3.0341** 
(2.04) 
6.5204*** 
(5.52) 
4.4625** 
(2.52) 
Observations 902 433 678 333 
Number of groups 233 126 227 118 
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Table 3: Robustness Test for Number of Acquisitions, Small Firms  
This Table gives results of poisson regressions with random effects. Observations are clustered around each 
group. For a description of the variables see Section 4.2. Small firms are firms with below-average sales. t-values 
are based on White heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
 Nominal exchange rate changes Real exchange rate changes 
Home sourced inputs ⋅ 
appreciation 
– 0.0007 
(1.20) 
– 0.0014** 
(2.14) 
– 0.0010 
(1.56) 
– 0.0012* 
(1.65) 
Output sold at Home ⋅ 
appreciation 
0.0008*** 
(3.03) 
0.0012*** 
(3.76) 
0.0008*** 
(2.71) 
0.0010*** 
(2.83) 
Leverage of newly 
acquired firms ⋅ 
appreciation 
0.006 
(0.47) 
0.0060 
(0.42) 
– 0.0034 
(0.24) 
0.0049 
(0.30) 
Share of external finance – 0.3972** (2.06) 
0.0834 
(0.27) 
0.4870** 
(2.30) 
0.0429 
(0.13) 
Log sector size 0.1867*** (6.82) 
0.2806*** 
(3.09) 
0.1828*** 
(6.38) 
0.1729*** 
(5.07) 
Log distance – 0.0688 (1.41) 
– 0.0075 
(0.07) 
– 0.0461 
(0.89) 
– 0.0558 
(0.95) 
R&D intensity  0.0559* (1.81)  
0.0556* 
(1.68) 
Lag number of 
acquisitions  
0.0099* 
(1.80)  
0.0105* 
(1.73) 
Constant –1.1668** (2.46) 
– 1.3897** 
(2.45) 
– 1.0520** 
(2.04) 
– 1.4460** 
(2.35) 
Observations 742 553 552 419 
Number of groups 215 151 210 148 
 
